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Alternative EORE 
Approaches
By Olena Kryvova [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ] 
Armed conflict has been ongoing in the east of Ukraine since 2014 and continues to have a fundamentally devastating impact on children, women, and men. With continuing hostilities and the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation in the region, 3.4 mil-
lion people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021. The elderly, persons with 
disabilities, female-headed households, and children are among the most vulnerable. Additionally, 
the large-scale population displacement from government and nongovernment controlled areas (GCA 
and NGCA respectively) of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, separated by the 427-km-long contact line, 
remains one of the highest concerns. 
 Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and landmines present a particular 
threat to the civilian population in this type of “frozen conf lict.” 
Many villages and towns on and near the contact line have not been 
evacuated as the occupants refuse to move or have no other place 
to relocate; and as a result, civilians carry on living and working 
near military installations. These civilians live alongside heavily 
fortified and mined checkpoints with daily artillery bombardments 
being commonplace. The population are exposed to mines and UXO 
as a part of daily life, and civilian casualties directly attributable to 
such hazards are growing. Mines and UXO also are denying citizens 
access to services such as water or, in the longer term, in the way in 
which they use the land: Many hectares of good farmland have been 
seeded with mines, impacting local livelihoods. Therefore, humani-
tarian mine action (HMA) remains one of the most important parts 
of the humanitarian response where, in certain areas, explosive ord-
nance risk education (EORE) is the only applicable HMA pillar for 
saving lives of civilians. 
Over the years, the majority of HMA interventions have been com-
pleted in the GCA rather than in the NGCA. Access by international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), particularly HMA, to the 
NGCA has been problematic since the conflict began. The provision 
of EORE has been a challenge, and very little of the at-risk population 
in the NGCA have received information about explosive hazards. The 
provision of EORE via the more traditional methods of direct presenta-
tion sessions to children and adults in their communities or in schools 
is generally not permitted. This is due to a perception by NGCA de 
facto authorities that EORE is a potential threat to security and may 
be used as propaganda by Ukraine. In 2020, FSD, with funding from 
the U.S. Department of State, began a project with the express objec-
tive of developing methods to target residents living in the NGCA. 
One approach is to access workers and members of the public who are 
required to cross the contact line to attend to administrative or work-
related issues while they are in the GCA, and the second involves the 
use of social media applications to target the population that cannot 
travel to the GCA.
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) is one of a small number of HMA INGOs operat-
ing in Ukraine. FSD began in late 2014 with mine risk education teams, then added community 
liaison and non-technical survey in 2015. Since 2016, FSD has conducted physical clearance projects and con-
tinued to expand its knowledge of the impact that explosive ordnance (EO) hazards have on the people living 
in the region.
EORE Team Leader 
Irina Mihei distributes 
information to an elderly 
man waiting to cross 
into the NGCA.
All graphics courtesy of FSD.
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EORE at Crossing Points
There are five entry/exit crossing points (EECPs) between the 
GCA and NGCA along the contact line in eastern Ukraine. Before 
the COVID-19 pandeminc, between 1 and 1.25 million people used 
these EECPs each month, with the vast majority (over 90 percent) of 
the crossings orginating in the NGCA. The majority of people cross-
ing the EECPs are over the age of sixty and are mostly doing so to 
attend to issues related to pensions/social payments or to withdraw 
cash. This results in a consistent opportunity to engage a signifi-
cant proportion of the NGCA population at the EECPs and at the 
various Ukraine government pension offices that are located close 
to the EECPs. Thus, FSD provides short, direct, and/or face-to-face 
EORE presentations and/or safety briefings at these locations, spe-
cifically targeting people visiting from the NGCA. Unfortunately, 
the COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant challenges to the 
implementation of this activity. On 21 March 2020, the contact line 
was sealed off to help curb the spread of the virus in the conf lict-
affected areas. Movement through the EECPs remains restricted 
and highly unstable due to the COVID-19 pandemic prevention 
measures adopted by the government of Ukraine and the NGCA 
de-facto authorities. As of May 2021, these restrictions are still 
enforced, and of the five EECPs, only two are operational. 
Thus, significant challenges revolve around the closure of the 
EECPs, and subsequent uncertainties surround the full reopening of 
the EECPs for normal use. Presently, very few people are permitted 
to cross through the two open EECPs into the GCA from the NGCA, 
and the crossing conditions for affected populations remains tense. In 
numerous cases, people were refused exit or were approved to exit but 
refused entry by the other “side.” In addition to COVID-19 restric-
tions, temporary closures and weather conditions also dramatically 
affected the number of crossings in 2020. The number of individual 
crossings from 21 March 2020 until the end of the year represented 
less than 3 percent of the level of crossings recorded in 2019 during the 
same period. 
However, FSD EORE teams have been at the operational EECPs 
(Stanytsia, Luhanska, and Novotroitske) from May 2020 until the 
present and able to conduct safety briefings for NGCA residents. The 
briefings normally take up to ten minutes and are provided to people 
as they wait in line. The key modules of a traditional EORE session 
are discussed with the affected population, including safe and unsafe 
behavior, reporting mechanisms, mine/UXO recognition, etc. The 
EORE team uses informational folders and posters containing pictures 
that help trainers promote safe behavior and provide visual briefings. 
Various types of education materials are also distributed. As the dis-
tribution of EORE materials is heavily regulated, each type of prod-
uct is designed in two languages (Russian and Ukrainian) to prevent 
any potential problems with authorities. While UNICEF approved 
FSD’s EORE materials for children, there is no functioning national 
authority at present to approve EORE materials for adults; however, 
all FSD EORE materials conform to IMAS standards. FSD teams use 
a variety of printed materials, including a pocket-sized brochure sum-
marizing key EORE messages, a coloring page designed for children, 
and an A5-sized leaflet describing safe/unsafe behavior and reporting 
mechanisms. The leaflet also contains a QR code that allows access to 
the project-dedicated social media landing page, which provides more 
EORE-specific information to those who are interested. 
EORE Team Leader Liudmila Kiyan explains the safe behavior 
rules for residents from the NGCA at the Stanytsia Luhanska 
EECP who are waiting to cross the contact line.
Digital EORE
FSD’s second approach to reach NGCA residents involves the use of 
social media to target those who cannot travel to the GCA. Inspired 
by a trial conducted in 2020 of the use of targeted social media adver-
tisements (i.e., Facebook [FB] ads) for delivery of EORE in Iraq, FSD 
is conducting a similar trial of the use of FB and Vkontakte (VK, the 
Russian version of FB) ads in eastern Ukraine, with an emphasis on 
reaching users living in the NGCA. The FSD conducted the trial over a 
six-month period in 2020 and decided to continue the trial project into 
2021. As there was a significant lack of EORE available via the social 
media sphere, especially in the NGCA, the media campaign objectives 
were to increase awareness about the explosive ordnance (EO) threat 
and introduce the consequences of risk-taking behavior. Moreover, the 
campaign sought to build a strong communication tool through posi-
tive dialogue in a constructive educational atmosphere. Therefore, FSD 
designed an online platform with fun and non-traditional formats to 
discuss the EO threat. The trial was divided into two modules: The first 
module focused on FB over the first three months of the trial (June–
August 2020), and the second focused on VK over three subsequent 
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months (October–December 2020). The methodology applied to both 
modules of the social media campaign and was divided into three key 
components: (1) the design of materials, (2) the development of the 
landing page, and (3) an interactive portion of the campaign. 
Together with a Ukrainian public relations company skilled in the 
design and employment of FB ads, FSD developed a project-specific 
landing page for targeting NGCA residents. FSD recycled some of the 
material developed for the FB module for the VK module. This allowed 
FSD to develop the second campaign significantly faster and start the 
VK trial shortly after the FB social media trial was completed. The 
ads were tailored to users based on their IP addresses. A new, project-
specific landing page, BezMin (Without Mines), was developed for FB 
and VK. By clicking on the link provided in the ad, users visited the 
BezMin page displaying appropriate EORE messaging, videos, and 
information on how to report suspected EO. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the content (particularly for NGCA 
residents), the page has neither donor nor FSD branding to promote 
the principle of neutrality in the posts and to attract a wider audience 
from the NGCA. 
A media content plan for the campaign consisted of various types 
of materials for at-risk communities. Comprising different types of 
material, each post covered one of several possible topics of the tra-
ditional EORE session: EO recognition, identifying potentially haz-
ardous areas, official marking (red warning sign with the message 
“Danger Mines”), unofficial marking (crossed sticks or home-made 
signs), unsafe behavior, safe behavior toward EO, what to do in case 
of an emergency, or reporting. Some posts contained images, which 
matched the various types of vegetation and weather conditions nor-
mally found in the region, and encouraged beneficiaries to identify the 
explosive hazards they found. 
Challenges during the interactive portion of the media campaign 
involved the use of specific terminology, and adherence to neutrality 
principles in posts and comments. Moreover, the Ukrainian govern-
ment currently restricts in-country access to VK. On the national level, 
Ukrainian-based internet service providers (ISPs) are not permitted to 
conduct any activities using VK. However, people in the NGCA can 
access VK through Russian infrastructure. Therefore, neither FSD nor 
Ukranian public relations specialists had practical experience or skills 
in conducting a targeted media campaign in Ukraine utilizing VK as a 
platform. However, FSD was able to find a method to conduct the VK 
media campaign using an independent PR company. The posting target 
was twenty-one posts per month. 
The first month of each module was used to develop brand aware-
ness. Over this period (the active phase), the target audience would 
become acquainted with the BezMin page. During the second and 
third months, the audience, now aware of the brand, began to show 
more interest in the posts and were keen to interact with and subscribe 
to the page. The highest number of followers was reached during the 
second and the thirds months of each module. 
Screenshot of a sample BezMin post on Vkontakte.
Screenshot of a sample post in Facebook.
Screenshot of a sample post in Facebook.
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As seen in Figure 1, 901 followers were attracted over the first three 
months of the FB module’s active phase, while only 101 new followers 
joined the FB page over the following three months where the FB cam-
paign was “dormant.” By comparison, the active phase of the VK cam-
paign had less than half the total number of followers when compared to 
FB during the same phase of the trial. Whereas the active phases reflect 
when the PR company was actively posting material to both FB and 
VK, the dormant phases reflect when no new posts were made to FB or 
VK. Demonstrating trends for both FB and VK, Figure 1 indicates that 
the most cost-effective use of available funding and beneficiary cover-
age for any social media campaign involves maintaining a high tempo 
of activity for at least six months. In order to maintain growth and 
reach a greater number of beneficiaries, the duration of future media 
campaigns was increased to six months. When measured by physical 
interactions with the ads, the FB module seemed significantly more 
successful across both the GCA and NGCA; however, an analysis of 
users’ locations indicated that for NGCA residents (the target audience 
for the trial), VK was more popular than FB. Moreover, the number of 
resident VK users in the NGCA is much higher than FB users, which led 
FSD to conclude VK was more popular in NGCA than FB.
Another distinct difference between VK and FB was audience age. 
VK permits children from the age of twelve to register, and children 
are its second largest demographic. Alternatively, FB requires users 
to be thirteen or older and is not as popular with children. Over 
the three months, the VK campaign 
reached 26,548 persons under the age 
of eighteen, compared to only 704 
children reached in the FB campaign. 
The VK network has a larger number 
of groups from educational institu-
tions compared to FB. One of the major 
achievements of the VK media cam-
paign trial is the fact that BezMin posts 
were reposted by various accounts and/
or groups managed by educational 
establishments. For example, FSD’s 
posts about unsafe behavior were 
reposted by a student group from the 
Civil Protection Institute in Luhansk 
People’s Republic, which had 179 fol-
lowers. BezMin was seen as a trust-
worthy source of information, and 
the method of delivery appeared to be 
appropriate and understandable.
More than half of BezMin users 
on FB (55 percent) are female, while 
the majority of interactions (reposts, 
clicks, and comments) were made by 
males; the major age group was in the 
35–44 range. On VK, 52 percent of 
active users of the BezMin page were 
males. The major age group is the same 
as in FB. The second largest age group 
were users under the age of eighteen. 
Geographically, 73 percent of VK ben-
eficiaries were from the NGCA; 5 per-
cent were based in the parts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk Oblasts in the GCA; and 
only 4 percent were located in other 
areas of Ukraine. The location of 18 
percent (or 34,979) of beneficiaries was 
not identified by VK social media; the 
use of a virtual private network (VPN) 
to enter the VK social media is likely to 
be the reason for this.
Map of eastern Ukraine 2021: GCA, NGCA, contact line and EECPs.
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During the social media campaign, there a number of NGCA cities 
that had beneficiaries covered by FB and VK. However, residents of 
Amvrosievka, Kadiyivka, Khartsyzsk, Kirovskoye, Lozove, Lutugino, 
Makeevka, Perevalsk, Pervomaysk, Rovenky, Sneznoe, Torez, and 
Vesëlaya Gora were covered by only one social media provider. 
Moreover, the FB campaign was able to reach internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) all over Ukraine. When these IDPs do return home to the 
NGCA, they will have an increased knowledge about safe behavior and 
how to protect themselves from explosive threats. 
During the planning phase for the trial it was assumed that the 
target audience would use mobile devices rather then desktops or 
laptops. The campaign determined that the hardware (smartphone, 
tablet, etc.) used to access FB or VK has a significant influence on the 
overall success of the media campaign. To view published posts, 92 
percent of VK followers and 88 percent of FB followers used mobile 
devices. Therefore, all informational material was designed for mobile 
devices and included high-resolution pictures, appropriate format-
ing, and selective keywords. For wider coverage of the target audience, 
the Russian language was used in both the campaigns and associated 
material for the NGCA audience. Some GCA followers criticize this 
approach; however, it was stressed that BezMin is a non-political edu-
cational platform, which aims to increase the awareness about explo-
sive hazards. When there was a need to provide a link to a source of 
information, an international (not Russian/Ukrainian) source was 
used for this purpose. Quoting international sources prevents accusa-
tions of information being false or propaganda.
The feedback has been overwhelmingly positive. The posts were 
designed to encourage beneficiaries to engage in online discussions 
regarding explosive threats, to ask questions, and to share opinions. For 
this reason, FSD used its staff to monitor the interactions. Monitoring 
included follow-up responses to questions, giving professional feed-
back, sharing best practices of safe behavior, and amending the page 
content based on audience requests. FSD was able to ensure the posts 
were targeted to the specific needs and concerns of the affected popula-
tion. For example, posts might ask, “Have you ever seen a minefield?” 
Beneficiaries could respond by sharing pictures or locations of the con-
taminated areas in their respective communities. The page became a 
platform for the discussion of EO-related information, potential haz-
ardous areas, and unsafe behavior trends. 
Conclusion 
In the case when a newly-created platform (such as BezMin) is devel-
oped, a period of at least three months should be allowed to develop a 
regular audience, conduct the needs assessment, and design the most 
suitable ways of interacting with the audience. However, due to a vari-
ety of subject areas related to EORE, it is suggested that the length of 
this type of initiative should be at least six months. 
Social media has more flexibility when compared to the standard 
face-to face EORE session, as it is not impacted by weather, the time of 
day, or other force majeure factors (such as the closure of the EECPs). 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, when quarantine restrictions and 
lockdowns were in force, the online format was the only applicable 
method for delivering EORE messages to residents of the NGCA. 
However, current EORE-sector thinking is that digital EORE cam-
paigns seem to be most effective when complementing, not replacing, 
other EORE activities at an interpersonal or face-to-face level. In this 
way, digital EORE becomes a highly cost-effective force multiplier, 
increasing reach and coverage while reinforcing messages provided 
through non-digital means of delivery. 
The BezMin landing page was a platform that was well accepted in 
both VK and FB modules, and the information presented is important 
and relevant to the residents of the conflict-affected areas (both the 
GCA and NGCA) of eastern Ukraine. The campaign also had the wel-
come benefit of reaching IDPs who relocated to other parts of Ukraine 
away from the conflict area. 
MODULE/EVENT CLICKS REPOSTS LIKES OTHER INTERACTIONS AND COMMENTS
Facebook (Jun–Aug 2020) 6,331 418 2,316 3,883
Vkontakte (Sept–Nov 2020) 3,918 32 715 99
Table 1. Social media interactions.
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Figure 1. FB and VK followers June–November 2020.
EORE Team Leader 
Irina Mihei distributes 
information to an elderly 
man waiting to cross 
into the NGCA.
Moreover, the BezMin posts are acces-
sible at any time convenient to the ben-
eficiary. Large numbers of people can be 
reached in a specific area, overcoming 
obstacles posed by security, geography, 
and complex operating environments 
that limit the delivery of face-to-face 
EORE. The flexibility of a social media 
campaign allows the EORE provider 
to target specific age, gender, or demo-
graphic groups depending on the proj-
ect’s priorities. However, it is less effective 
when the target audience is the elderly or 
young children under the age of twelve. 
Moreover, immediately after an incident 
or accident involving EO and civilians 
occurs, posts can be made as a form of 
“emergency” EORE. 
This pilot project shows the potential 
of using social media for EORE in areas 
with a reasonable communications network. Digital tools are less 
effective in areas with poor internet connectivity or reduced mobile 
data coverage. Nevertheless, the ongoing success of a social media 
campaign relies on regular, new, and interesting content. A lack of new 
posts equates to a decrease of a beneficiary’s interest and leads to the 
decrease of EO-threat awareness. The social media campaign can have 
long-term benefits as long as it is maintained and operational. 
In the NGCA at present, where physical access is very difficult or not 
possible at all, the FSD social media campaign (a trial) is one of very 
few alternatives for residents to access information about EO and to 
interact with an EORE professional. While the conflict is ongoing, 
continuation of the social media campaigns is crucial for raising 
awareness and promoting safe behavior in the conflict-affected com-
munities in eastern Ukraine. As a result of additional funding from the 
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